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Rapporteur's heface
In prepanng the present report, the Rapporteur was extremely fortunate to receive a great deal of
assistance from the authontics consulted and would lke to take this opportunity to publicly thank all
concemed for their coopcration.
On I I luly 1997, the Rapporteur mct Mr Bill Hopkinson, Assistant Under-Secretary, Policy, at the
Ministry of Defence, London.
The Rapporteur also had discussrons wrth the following permanent representatives to the Orgarusatron
for Secunty and Cooperation in Europe and ther stafi Ln Vrcnna on 2 and 3 September 1997:
H.E Ambassador Hansjorg Eiff, Head of the German Delegation;
H.E Ambassador Alexander Gruchko, Head of thc Russian Delegation,
H E Ambassador Adam Kobieracki, Head of the Pohsh Delegation;
H.E. Ambassador Johannes Landman, Head of the Netherlands Delegation,
General Greg Govan, Uruted States Delegation;
Mr Paul Flaherty, Counsellor, United Krngdom Delegation;
Mr Graham Paul, Counscllor, French Delcgatron;
At a dmner on 2 Septembcr 1997 hosted by Mr Paul Flahertv of the Uruted Krngdom Delegation, a
discussion took place u.ith the follourng particrpants:
Mr Gabor Brodi, Head of the Hungarian Delegation;
Mr Namik Erpul, Counsellor, Turkish Delegation,
Mr Oystein Hovdkinn, Minister, Norwegian Delegatron.
Mr Ivo Petrov, Head of the Bulgarian Delegation;
Mr Vagrf Sadl'khov, Head of the Azerbarjan Delegation,
Mr Lamberto Zanmer, Counsellor, Italian Delegatron
At a lurcheon on 3 September 1997 hosted b1, H E Ambassador Eiff of Germany, a round table
drscussion tmk place r.vith the follourng partrcrpants'
H E Ambassador Antonio Cosano, Spanish Delcgatron.
H E Ambassador Herve Ladsous, French Delegation;
H. E Ambassador Johannes Landman, Netherlands Delegatron;
Mr Evangelos Denaxas, Greek Delegation,
Mrs Mana da Graca Qucrroz Goncalves Pererra. Portugcse Dclegatron:
Mr Nrgel Hapi'ood, Unrtcd Krngdom Delcgatron,
Mr Gerard Philipps. Luxembourg Delegatron,
Mr Jean-Joel Schittecatte, Belgium Delegatron;
Mr Klaus Zilhkens. German Delegation
ln Geneva on 9 October 1997, the Rapporteur met the follou.rng representatrves from delegatrons of thc
Uruted Nations Confcrence on Drsarmament
N{r Klaus Achenbach. Counsellor, Gcrman Delegation.
Mr Jean-Michel Dcspax. First Counsellor, and Mr Frangors Rhein, Counscllor, Frcnch
Delegation:
Mr Frank Ma.;oor. Permanent Reprcsentatrve, and Mr Onno Kervers, Counscllor. Nethcrlands
Delegatron.
Mr Rrchard Tauu'hare. Deputy' Permanent Reprcscntatrve. United Kingdom Delegatron.
Mr Valen, Zemskov, Deputy Permanent Reprcsentatrve, Russran Delegatron.
At the rcquest of the Rapporteur, the Dcfence Counscllor also mct Mr Cnsprn Hain-Colc. Head of
drsarmament. arms control and coopcratrve secunf,,, NATO, u'ho had formcrll'been a member of the Uruted
Krngdom Delegatron to the OSCE m Vrcma
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Draft Order
on the state of affairs in disarmament (CFE, nuckar disarmament)
The Assembly,
(, Aware of the negotiations in Vienna to adapt the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE);
(it) Convinced that an adapted CFE Treaty, no longer based on the cold war bloc-to-bloc approach
but rather on a system of national and territorial ceilings for treaty-limrted equipment, will be an essen-
tial step towards enhanced security in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals;
(ru) Taking into account the international efforts to draw up a treaty to ban anti-personnel land-
mines;
(w) Arvare of the many bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce nuclear arrns arsenals and to pro-
mote nuclear disarmament;
(v) Worried over reports mentroning the risks of a deterioration of Russia's nuclear forces,
INSTRUCTS ITS DEFENCE COMMITTEE
To keep itself fully informed about all the abovementioned issues and report to the fusembly
if any important new developments require the latter to take action.
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I. Introduction
l. In spring 1990, your Rapporteur prepared
a report on the negotiations on conventional
armed forces in Europe. These negotiations were
concluded that same year with the signature of
the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe
(cFE).
2. Since then many new developments have
taken place. East-west relations have seen a
huge improvement but, at the same time, a num-
ber of violent conflicts have taken place both in
Europe and elservhere 
- 
such as the Gulf war,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Great Lakes and
Chechnya.
3. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that in the
civilised rvorld there is a growing conviction that
fewer arms are needed to maintaur and guarantee
peace and security in the vvorld. This growing
conviction has resulted in unexpected progress in
the field of disarmament. A number of nerv dis-
armament treaties and agreements have been
concluded to reduce the numbers ofboth conven-
tional and nuclear weapons and to control the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
4. In the present report an effort has been
made to describe succinctly the most important
recent developments in the field of disarmament,
wrthout claiming to be exhaustive. The report
does not drscuss the Treaty on the limitation of
anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM Treaty), the
missile technology control regime (MTCR) and
the Wassenaar Arrangement u,hich succeeded
COCOM, since these have been discussed in
reports of the Technological and Aerospace
Committeer. No recommendations to the Council
have been proposed since the Council as such is
not involved in any of these negotiations. The
I enti-Uattistic mrssile defence, zubmined by Mr
l*r:r:er, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1339); Anti-
mrssile defence for Europe 
- 
guidelines draun from the
sl,rnposiunL submitted bv Mr Lerlzer, Rapporteur
(Assembly Document 1363); Traruatlantic cooperalon
on European anti-missile defence 
- 
Part I, subnutted bi'
Mr Atkrnson, Rapporteur (Assembly Document 1435)
and Part II, submitted by Mr Atkrnson, Rapporteur
(Assembly Documcnt 1588).
Exp lanatory Memorandu m
(submitted by Lord Newall, Rapporteur)
possibility cannot, however, be excluded that in
the future the disarmament process will have
direct consequences for the maintenance ofpeace
and security in Europe The Defence Committee
is therefore obliged to monitor the disarmament
process closely and give its oprnion on those con-
sequences, if it is deemed necessary.
II. The Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe and its adaptation
(i) The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE Treaty)
5. On 14 November 1990 in Pans, the 16
member states of NATO and the 6 member states
of the Warsaw Pact signed the Treatl, on Con-
ventional Forces in Europe. This Treaty, lvhich
entered into force on l7 July 1992, established a
balance of conventional armed forces at lower
levels. It contained comprehensive provisions for
transparency and information exchange backed
up by a verification regime rvhich rvould make it
impossible for an aggressor to launch a surprise
attack and begin a large-scale offensrve.
6. The CFE Treaty operates through agreed
and verified limits on five systems of heary
mrlitary equipment, in particular tanks, armoured
combat vehicles, artillery, combat arrcraft and
attack helicopters, known collectivell' as Treatl,
Lrmited Equipment (TLE). In accordance u,ith
the Treaty, States Parties have mostly reduced
their weapon holdings to bring them doun to
agreed levels The Treaty area is divided rnto
four zones and, to prevent an excessive concen-
tration of convcntional weapons systems ln cen-
tral Europe and the flank region2, there are hmrts
on the number of TLE itcms which mav be hcld
in any one zone.
7. On 14 June 1991, the Soviet Unron cntered
into trvo accompanying commrtments 
- 
one
legalll, binding and onc polrtical. The first de-
tails of the Soviet reduction obligation related to
2 The flank regron covers Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Bulgaria, Georgra, Greece, Iceland, Moldova, Nonvay,
Romaru4 north-western and southem parts of Russra,
northern parts ofTurkey and part ofsouthern Ll}<rarne.
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equipment of trcaty-limited types in naval infan-
try and coastal defence forces The second
agreement committed the Soviet Union to destroy
more than l4 500 pleces of militarl'equipment of
treaty-limited types east of the Ural Mountains, a
region outslde the Treaty area of applicatron.
This political commrtment resulted from NATO
concems about Soviet military equipment moved
out of the Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) appli-
cation zone of the Treatl' during the negotiating
period prior to signature.
8. The Treaty includes unprecedented provi-
srons for detailed informatron exchanges, on-site
inspections, challenge inspections, and on-site
monitoring of destruction. NATO has estab-
lished a systcm to cooperate in monitoring the
Treaty. Partres have nghts to monitor the proc-
ess of destruction n,ithout quota limits A Proto-
col on Notrfication and Exchange of Information
stipulates an annual exchange of mandated data
that helps ensure venficatron of comphance u,ith
the Treaty'
9 A Protocol on Inspection dctails proce-
dures for venfication. Inspections are conducted
routrnely during the (rndefinrte) duration of the
Treaty, they focus on "ob3ects of venfication"
(e.g military organisatrons), and are conducted
at "declared sites" (e g military facrlrtres).
These OOVs and sites are listed in each infor-
mation exchange.
10. After the drssolution of the Warsarv Pact,
the former Warsarv Pact states concluded a
legally bindrng agreement at Budapest, in spring
1991, allocatrng the equrpment entrtlements of
the Central and East European Group of States
Parties After the drssolution of the Soviet Uruon,
erght of the former Soviet Unron successor states
- 
Armema, Azerbar.;an, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Moldova. Russra and Ukrarne 
- 
had
territory covered by the Trealv provrsrons and
thus became Treaty members They negotiated
the allocatron of rveapon entitlements among
themselves and the resultrng Tashkent Agreement
of 15 May 1992 set out agreed indrvidual cerl-
ings These allocatrons and the rrghts and obli-
gations of the neu' States Partres were recognised
by all Treaty members at therr extraordrnary
meeting rn Oslo, on 5 June 1992 Also, rvhen the
Czech and Slovak Republics became scparate
States Partres, on I Januarl' 1993, their acces-
sion to the CFE Treatl' was approved on 5 Feb-
ruary 1997 and details of the division of the obli-
gations of former Czechoslovakra lvere formal-
ised accordingly.
I I The weapons reduction process rmposed
b1'the CFE Treatl' required 25oh completion by
November 1993, 50yo by November 1994, and
100% by November 1995, after rvhich the CFE
limits were to be fully implemented.
12. Although all the States Parties made
efforts to destroy- or drsable therr equipment as
provided for in the Protocol on Reductions, it
rvas noted that by,the 16 November 1995 dead-
line, several states had not fulfilled some treaty
obligations.
13. Russia had the greatest number of liabili-
ties. In the area be1'ond the Urals, it had des-
trol'ed only one thrrd of its liabilities in conven-
tronal armaments and equipment The unre-
solved dispute with [Ikraine over the division of
the Black Sea Flcet and the status of the Sevas-
topol base had caused delays in the destructron of
infantrl' and coastal dcfence equipment. Liabili-
ties beyond the Urals are not subject to verifica-
tion but at the CFE Treaty Review Conference rn
Vienna rn May 1996, Russia stated that rt u,ould
demonstrate that all holdrngs on rts territon' had
been destrol,ed or rendered milrtanly' unusable.
Russra also made other specrfic pledges to meet
its destructron obligations and Western teams
were grven the task of verifring that it had abrded
b1'the terms of those pledges3
14. Belarus, u'hrch failed to meet an Apnl
1996 and a November 1997 deadhne, rvas de-
clared to have completed its reductrons as of I
Januarl' 1997 Mrnor problems u'ere reportcd
regardrng Ukrarne. Hungary, Poland. Romania,
Slovakia and Georgia Both Armenra and Azer-
barlan have long farled to declare therr equipment
holdrngs and accept an1'formal destructron habil-
itl, By' the officral deadhne for the destructron
process, Armenra had surplus armoured combat
vehrclcs s'hrle Azerbarlan claimed that rt could
not account for some 700 TLE items lost to rebel
forccs in Nagorno-Karabakha. For some 1'ears
norv the t\\,o countnes have been rearmrng more
or less officialll' and sometrmes in vrolatron of
the ceilings set bi' the CFE Treatr' (and con-
firmed by the 1992 Tashkent Agreement). In thc
t 57PR1 Yearbook 1997,pages472{73I lbtd,page472
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case of Armenia, the Russian Federation has
been its largest supplier, sometimes in excess of
all inter-state agreements and even without the
official permission of the government, which is
tantamount to acknowledging that such transfers
of equipment have not been notified, as they
should be under the rules binding on the signato-
ries of the CFE Treaty. According to Armenia,
Azerbaijan is receiving equipment from Ukrarne
not all of which has been the subject of a decla-
ration as the Treaty also requires.
15. All these questions were discussed and
recommendations rvere made in both the Joint
Consultative Group and at the 1996 Revierv
Conference in Vienna. The JCG rvas urged to
resolve implementation issues in parallel with the
CFE adaptation negotiations in Vienna.
16. As mentioned above, settlement of the
problem of the Russian Federation and Ukraine
sharing the Black Sea Fleet was a factor that
blocked full application of the provisions of the
CFE Treaty,. It should be noted that the signa-
ture on 3l May 1997 of the Treaty of friendship,
cooperation and partnership between the two
countries has, in principle, resolved this issue.
Russia undertook to hire the installations neces-
sary for the fleet's operation, in Sevastopol and
other areas of the Crimean peninsula, for a
penod of 20 years. Ukraine took control of
about l8% of the origrnal fleet, i.e. about 162
ships of all types
17. By the end of 1996, more than 51 300
items of treaty-limited conventional tveapons
equipment had been destrol,ed or permanentlv
converted to non-military use rn order to meet
reductron liabilities. In addition, another 9 900
items rvere notified b1' Russra for destruction or
conversion beyond the Treatl, area of application,
and the States Parties notified another 2 400
rtems as voluntarily reduced below their specrfied
limrts Over 2 700 on-site inspections had been
conducted. These inspections, conducted by rep-
resentatives from both groups of statcs, examined
weapons destruction events, as u,ell as sites or
areas reported or suspected to contain military
equipment.
18 A detailed survey of CFE ceilings, liabili-
ties, reductions and holdrngs is grven in Appendi-
ces I and II5.
19. In accordance with Article XVI of the
CFE Treaty, the States Parties established a Joint
Consultative Group (JCG) rn order to promote
the objectives and implementation of the provr-
sions of the Treaty. Article XVI provides a full
catalogue of subjects to be dealt u'ith in the
framework of ttre Joint Consultative Group,
which is composed of representatives from all 30
CFE States Parties.
20. The JCG takes decisions or makes recom-
mendations by consensus. It holds sessions twice
a year in Vienna, with each session lasting four
weeks unless othenvise agreed. In practice, the
JCG has been in virtually continuous session
ever since late 1990. It has, among other things,
negotrated a number of agreements to facrlitate
and ensure the implementation of the CFE
Treaty. Altogether, it can be noted that the JCG
has played an essential role in the implementation
of the CFE inspection and reductron regrmes,
including the development of standard inspec-
tions, notification forms and new. streamlmed
arrangements for equipment destruction. At pres-
ent, the JCG is negotratrng CFE adaptation.
(ii) Other commitments related
to the CFE Treaty
2l Three politically binding declarations were
agreed to rvhen the CFE Treaty was signed on 19
November 1990. These commitments consolidate
the provisions of the Treaty
(i) Declaration by the Government of
the Federal Republic of Germany on the
Personnel Strength of German Armed
Forces
In this unrlateral declaratron. the Federal
Republic of Germany pledged to reduce
the personnel strength of the armed forces
of a united Germanl, to 370 000 urthrn
three to four y'ears of the entn' mto force
of the CFE Treaty
ftr) Declaratron of the States Partres to
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe wrth Respect to Personnel
Strength
In order to facrlrtate follou,-on negotiations
as called for in Article XVIII of the CFE
Treaty, which led to the CFE-IA Agree-
ment on 6 July 1992, the Parties to the
' STPR/ Yearbook I 997, pages 4'7047 I
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Treaty agreed not to increase the peace-
time personnel strength of their conven-
tional armcd forces in the reglon during
these negotiatrons
(tu) Declaration of the States Partres to
the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe u'rth rcspect to Land-Based
Naval Aircraft
The mandate under ri'hich the CFE Treaty
ll'as negotiated expressly'includes all con-
ventronal armaments and equipment pcr-
manently based on land rn the ATTU area
The Russians adamantly opposed counting
their land-based naval aircraft (LBNA) as
coming under CFE arrcraft ceilings, sincc
US and other Western carner-based air-
craft u'ould not be counted. It was finally
agreed that a political commitment rvould
cap LBNA separately outsidc thc Treatl,
Accordrng to this declaratron, each group
of states commits rtself to hold no more
than 430 LBNA combat arrcraft m the
CFE zone, of u'hich no more than 400 may
belong to any one state. It also bans the
subordinatron ofattack helicopters to land-
based naval forces
(iii) The CFE-IA Agreement
22 In Artrcle XVIII, the CFE Treatv called
for a contrnuation ofnegotratrons on conventional
armed forces x'ith the same mandate and rn order
to ''conclude an agreemcnt on addrtronal meas-
ures aimed at further strengthcnrng securitv and
stabilrtf in Europe and [...] rncludrng measures to
hmrt the personnel strength of their conventronal
armed forces urthrn the area of apphcation"
These negotlatlons rverc u'ound up on 6 Jull'
1992 u,rth the conclusron of an agreement called
CFE-lA u-hose rmplementatron began on l7 July
t992
23 CFE-IA constrtutes a polrtrcal commrt-
mcnt b1' lts srgnatones to hmrt and. *here apph-
cablc, reduce the personnel strcngth of thcrr con-
ventional armed forccs In contrast to the CFE
Treatl'. CFE-lA rs not a legally' brndrng agrce-
ment and thus not sublect to ratificatron b1' par-
haments
24. The core of the CFE-IA agrcement is a
"cerltng" on the mrlrtan, pcrsonncl of each par-
ticipating state u,ithin the CFE Treaty's area of
apphcation. Each partrcipatrng state determined
its oun ceilmg, taking into conslderatron its
national defence plans and secunty interests.
These numerical ceihngs were not subject to
negotiation among the participants. although the
levels r+'ere open to discussron pnor to adoptron
of the agreement In gcneral terms. the CFE-IA
limitation apphes to land-based mrlrtary person-
nel in the area of application.
25. The CFE-IA agrecment also provides for
a broad, detailcd exchange of information on the
military manpower of the participating states. In
general, information provided for most categones
is broken down to shorv the strength of individual
units at the level of brigade or regiment and
higher.
26. To furthcr enhance securitl' and promote
transparenc), among the participating states, the
CFE-lA agreement rncludes three stabrhsing
measures, requlrmg the notification of srgnrficant
lncreases in unrt strength. call-up of reserves or
resubordinatron of units.
(iv) The 1996 Reviae Conference in Wenna
27 Article XXI I of the CFE Treaty provrdes
for perrodic revieu' conferences, the first to bc
held 46 months after its entry into force and at
five-r'ear rntcrvals thereafter.
28. The first CFE Re','rew' Conference !\'as
held from 15 to 3l Ma1' 1996 rn Vrenna. Thrs
conference dcalt rn partrcular rvrth an examtna-
tron of the rmplemcntation of thc hmrtation and
rcduction pro'v'lslons of the Treah and *'rth an
assessment of thc apphcation of rts vcrificatlon
and informatlon provlsrons
29 The most rmportant results of the Revrerv
Conference w'ere
- 
the slgnaturc of a Flank Document
Agreement to thc CFE Treatr, (sec
Chapter VI),
- 
thc dectsron to start the process of
adaptrng thc CFE Trcan' to the nov
secuntv srtuatron rn Europe b1,definrng
the "scope and parameters" of Treat,v
adaptation as a matter of prioritv Thc
final ob.;ectrve of its adaptatron uas to
pcrmrt thc CFE Treatr to sustarn lts
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key role in the European security archi-
tecture;
A progress report on the intermediate
results of this adaptation process, in-
cluding recommendations on the way
fonvard was to be considered at the
OSCE summit in Lisbon in December
1996
30. It should be pointed out that the dissolu-
tion of the Warsarv Pact challenged many of the
premises rvhich had been the basis of the CFE
Treaty. Partres to the Treaty can no longer be
divided into a NATO and a Warsaw Pact group,
cold war arrns concentration in central Europe
has lost its meaning, the zone system is less rele-
vant and the Treaty may have to be opened to
new parties. Moreover, Russia has grou.n in-
creasingly worried about the prospect of NATO
enlargement, pointing out that the ratio of Rus-
sian to NATO forces has changed consrderably
to NATO's advantage.
31. In preparing the scope and parameters
document for the Lisbon agreement, Russia pro-
posed a large number of subjects for the negotla-
tions to adapt the CFE Treaty' Its man1, pro-
posals included a revision of the group structure
rvrth a sl,stem speciflrng national levels, rcgula-
tron of the status of conventional armed forces
statroned on forergn territory, revision of regional
limitatrons and the possibilitl, of using armed
forces for peacekeeprng purposes. Central Euro-
pean countnes rvere particularly keen on adapt-
ing thc Treatl' to their expectations regarding
future membership of NATO NATO's approach
was rather cautious and limited because it
rvanted to respond to Russian demands but at thc
same trme have enough room for manoeuvre It
u'as keen to maintain the integrity of the Treaty,,
but rvas prepared to revierv the group structure
and consider voluntarl' accession by other statcs.
(v) The Flank Document Agreement
32 Soon after the entry into force of thc CFE
Agreement, both Ukrainc and Russia complarned
that the1, had problems wrth the rmplcmentatron
of the Article V limitatron on Treatl' Limited
Equipment that can be located in thc flank area
of a countrl,
33 In September 1993, the representative of
Ukraine pornted out to the Joint Consultative
Group that it consrdered the flank limrts imposed
upon it completely unjustified. He noted that this
would force lIkraine to ensure the defence ofone
quarter of its territory with only l7o/o of rts avarl-
able tanks, 7o/o of its armoured combat vehrcles
and 22Y, of its artrllery. It should be noted that
at the time Ukraine also needed to confirm and
emphasise its sovereignty and that the flank lim-
its rvould also oblige it to abandon existing in-
frastructures and build new ones at considerable
cost.
34 Soon aftenvards, the Russian President,
Boris Yeltsrn, wrote to all NATO leaders re-
questing the removal of Article V of the CFE
Treaty. His main reasons were: the drastrc
changes that had occurred in the polrtrcal situa-
tion on the continent, the increased turmoil along
Russra's borders, and the complex economic and
social problems the Russian Federatron rvas
contending rvith owing to the redeployment of
massive numbers of troops from eastem Europe
Presrdent Yeltsin also observed that the trvo dis-
tricts constraincd by, Artrcle V (Lenrngrad and
North Caucasus) comprised over half the tern-
tory of European Russia, and that the restrarnts
laid down u,ere drscriminatory as thcy were not
imposed in a simrlar fashion on an)' Westem
state.
35. Russra also had other rmportant consrd-
erations As a result of the rmplosion of the for-
mer Soviet Unron. thc North Caucasus Military
Drstnct had been transformed from a rear arca
into a border district. Moreover, Russia noted a
rrsrng thrcat to stabrlrty on its southern flank. due
to such factors as independence movements
rvrthrn its borders and Muslim fundamentahsm at
rts bordcrs.
36 While the Unrted States and the Unitcd
Krngdom in partrcular tvere prepared to rcact
positivcll, and constructivcll,, others u,erc less
enthusiastrc. In partrcular, Nonl,al' and Turkey.
u'hich both bordcr the flank area. inrtralll, op-
posed any compromise on the flanks Turkel'
strongll' believes that Russia maintams rmpcrial-
tst ambitrons rn thc Caucasus rcglon and rs the
pnme mover behrnd hostrlrtrcs rn Georgra as rvell
as behind thc rvar bctu'een Armenra and Azerbai-
jan over Nagorno-Karabakh An rncrcase rn
Russian forces rn the flank area u'ould also re-
duce the \\'arnlng trme avarlable to Turkel' and
Norway and thus run counter to therr sccurltv
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interests. Finally, these countries argue that a
change in the CFE Treaty or its overall demise
could pave the way for a renewed European or
regional arrns race due to new tensions brought
about by the end of the cold rvar.
37. The United States, showing understanding
for the problems facurg Ukraine and Russia,
made great efforts to conclude an agreement
which was finally signed at the CFE Review
Conference in Vienna on 3l May 1996.
38. In the Flank Document Agreement, certain
territory has been removed from the original
flank zone, resulting in a "map realignment"
which reduces the size of the zone. Additional
constrarnts are imposed upon equipment in the
areas removed from the flank zone and additional
transparency measures apply to both the flank
zone and those areas removed from the flank
zone.
39. The Flank Document Agreement allows
the Russian Federation the right to utilise "to the
maximum extent possible" the CFE Treaty pro-
visions that allorv temporary deployment of
equipment rvithin and outside its territory', to be
achieved through free negotiations and rvith full
respect to states' sovereignty'. In addition, the
Russran Federation has the right to utilise "to the
maximum extent possible" the reallocation of
current quotas for equipment, to be achieved
through free negotiatrons and rvith full respect for
sovereigntl' of the States Parties involved. In
addrtron, Russia must lower its force levels in the
region so that rts equipment holdings in the old
and neu'flark zone meet all CFE obligations by
3l May 1999.
40. The Baltic states, which in the autumn of
l99l had decided to dissocrate themselves from
the CFE regime, were not pleased rvith the Flank
Document Agreement rvhich allorved Russia to
raise its ceihng for armoured combat vehicles in
the Pskov enclave from 180 to 600 They de-
plored the fact that security' rn their region was
dimrnrshed through an mcreased military pres-
ence near therr borders.
41. On 8 April 1997, Azerbarjan, Ukrainc and
Moldova announced their intention not to ratifo
the Flank Document Agreement, arguing that in
therr vierv thc text legrtimised the presence of
Russran forces in the former Soviet republics.
But in the end they drd rati$ it, under consider-
able United States pressure, thereby enabling the
Flank Document Agreement to come into force
on l5 May 1997.
(vi) The OSCE summit meeting in Lisbon
42. In the context of the OSCE summit meet-
ing in Lisbon on 2 and 3 December 1996, the 30
CFE states agreed on a scope and parameters
document. This document contains the terms of
reference for negotiations to adapt the CFE
Treaty to the political and militarl' changes that
have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was
signed in November 1990.
43. For these negotiations, it u'as agreed to
retain all categories of TLE, the information and
verification regimes and the area of application.
The parties would discuss the evolution of the
group structure and the possibility of other states
acceding to the Treaty. They would also discuss
a possible system of national limits for Treaty
Limited Equipment, the development of redistri-
bution mechanisms and provisions on zonal and
aggregate numbers preserving the pnnciples of
zonal limitations and avoiding an1' destabilising
accumulation of forces. The parties would also
consider means to make sure that the Treaty
functioned dunng crises and examine conflicts
and rules for the involvement of forces in UN or
OSCE peacekeeping operations and for tempo-
rary deployments rvhich would exceed the agreed
limrts. Finall1,, it u,as agreed that the parties
would address the possibility of including new or
expanded categories of conventional rveapons or
equipment.
44. Negotiations in the Joint Consultative
Group rvere to start in Vienna on 2l January
1997 and a progress report rvas to be submitted
to the OSCE ministerial meeting rn Copenhagen
at the end of 1997 The scope and parameters
document mentioned mid-1998 as a rough dead-
line for completron of the CFE adaptation nego-
tiations
(vii) The Founding Act
on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security
between NATO and the Russian Federation
45. When it became clear that rts enlargement
pohcy mrght casily resuscitate the antagonistic
rhetoric of the cold rvar days, NATO realised
l0
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that a substantial gesture had to be made in order
to meet Russia's demand that it participate ex-
tensively in the Euro-Atlantic security discussion.
NATO accordingly proposed the elaboration of
what was called a "Charter" on its relations with
Russia. After intensive negotiations on both
form and substance, a Founding Act on Mutual
Relations, Cooperation and Secunty between
NATO and the Russian Federation was signed in
Paris on 27 May 1997. This Founding Act
based relations between NATO and Russia on a
number of principles and stipulated the creation
of a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council with
the aim of progressively building up trust, unity
of purpose and the habit of consultation and co-
operation between NATO and Russia. It enu-
merated a large number of areas for such consul-
tation and cooperation.
46. In Chapter IV on politico-military matters,
specific attention was paid to the importance of
the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe for the broader context
of security in the OSCE area. It rvas further
stipulated that:
"NATO and Russia believe that an impor-
tant goal of CFE Treaty adaptation should
be a significant lowering in the total
amount of Treaty-Limited Equipment
permitted in the Treaty's area of applica-
tion compatible with the legitimate defence
requirements of each State Party. NATO
and Russia encourage all States Parties to
the CFE Treaty to consider reductions in
their CFE equipment entitlements, as part
of an overall effort to achieve lower
equrpment levels that are consistent with
the transformation of Europe's security
environment.
The member states of NATO and Russia
propose to other CFE States Parties to
carr,' out such adaptation of the CFE
Treaty' so as to enable States Parties to
reach, through a transparent and coopera-
tive process, conclusrons regarding reduc-
tions they might be prepared to rnake and
resulting national Treaty-Limited Equip-
ment ceilings. These will then be codified
as binding limits in the adapted Treaty to
be agreed by consensus of all States Par-
ties, and revieu'ed rn 2001 and at five-year
intervals thereafter. In doing so, the States
Parties will take into account all the levels
of Treaty-Limited Equipment established
for the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area by the
original CFE Treaty, the substantial re-
ductions that have been carried out since
then, the changes to the situation in Europe
and the need to ensure that the security of
no state is diminrshed."
Finally,
"The member states of NATO and Russia
[reaffrrmed] that States Parties to the CFE
Treaty should maintarn only such military
capabilities, individually or in conjunction
with others, as are commensurate with in-
dividual or collective legitimate security,
needs, takrng into account their intema-
tional obligations, including the CFE
Treaty."
(viii) The present CFE-adaptation
negotiations in Wenna
47. In the negotiations r,i'hich started in Vienna
on 2l January 1997 , Russia again made rt clear
that it was not pleased by the forthcoming NATO
enlargement, which would expand one of the two
blocs which had played such an important role in
the negotiations and establishment of the CFE
Treaty. It is rndeed true that one of the objec-
tives of the CFE adaptation process rvas to do
away with the bloc-to-bloc approach
48. When it appeared that negotiations in
Vienna rvere close to deadlock, NATO countries
made it clear that they uere prepared to make
unilateral reductrons to their Trean,-allocated
armaments ceilings that u'ent further than those
artrounced earlier. On 26 June 1997, NATO
declared that it uas rvilling to eliminate E0% of
the armaments rt is authorised to store This in-
volved materiel that the Bntish, Americans and
Germans could have kept in rvarehouses as re-
seryes in the event of a ma.1or crisrs. In ell,
NATO rvould be lorvering rts global weapons
ceilings by l0%. This meant it uould onll,have
a rrght to 16 794 tanks and 17 372 artillery
pleces, compared to 20 000 each for these trvo
categories under the CFE Treaty It rvould also
have a right to 2'1 7lt armoured combat vehicles,
against 30 000 ongrnallv The Unrted States, thc
United Kingdom, France and ltall' sard they u,ere
willing to lower, on a national basrs. the cerlings
u
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on u,eapons they could deploy rvrthin their op-
erational unrts. France announced a drop of
about 5% in its national land weapons ceiling;
the United Kingdom made a srmilar offer for the
categories of equipment covered by the Treaty
(tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, heli-
copters and fighter planes). The Unrted States
agreed to a ceiling of I 812 tanks (against
4 006), 3 037 armoured vehicles (against 5 372),
I 553 artrllerl, pieces (against 2 492) and 404
helicopters (against 431). Ital1, would agree to
an average 6o/o drop in its ceilings. However,
these countries rvere not wilhng to reduce the
number of fighter planes they can statton m
Europe (784) Earlier, on 14 March 1997,
NATO had already declared that rt drd not fore-
see perrnanent or additional stationing of large
fighting forces ln new member states after its
enlargement.
49. On 23 luly 1997 , the Joint Consultative
Group, in rvhich all 30 CFE States Parties par-
ticipate, decided to adopt a number of basic ele-
ments for treatl' adaptation. The most tmportant
u,as the decisron to replace the bloc-to-bloc
structure by, a s1'stem rvhrch rvill set national and
terntorial cerlings for each countrJ' National
cerhngs x,ill determinc the number of Treatl,
Lrmrted Equipment (TLE) items each State Party
is allou'ed to have in the Treaty's area of apph-
catron. Territonal ceilings u,rll replace the exrst-
ing structure of zones. These terntonal ceihngs
urll cover the number of rleapons of natronal
forces and of foreign forces deploy'ed or hkely'to
be deplol,ed rn a specrfic country (the so-called
statroned forces)
50 The CFE zone of applicatron u'ill no
longer be subdrvided into geographic zones rr-ith
rcgronal sub-cerhngs. tnstead. accordtng to Art-
rcle l3 of the JCG's decrsron
"The adaptatron process u'ill rnclude con-
sideratron of the possibility of estabhshrng
specrfic stabihsing measures, u'hich mrght
rnclude measures of restratnt or constramts
rn particular regrons and areas of the
Treatr"s area of apphcation. rncludrng
central and eastern Europe, in order to
prevent an1' potentrallv threatening burld-
up ofconventional forces "
5l As regards stationed forces. it x'as also
decrded to ''develop addrtronal informatron re-
quirements and measures of transparency ln re-
spect of statroned forces, including pre-notifica-
tion of changes in the equipment holdings of a
stationed forces unit".
52. Russia rs determined to limit the possibili-
ties for permanent stationing and temporary de-
ployrnent of NATO forces on the territory of its
member states. Dtscussions on this contentious
issue have not y'et led to a final settlement. As
mentioned earlier, NATO had already declared
on 14 March 1997 that it did not foresee penna-
nent and additional stationing of large fighting
forces in neu' member states after its enlarge-
ment, partly in order to allay Russian security
concerns about NATO's expansion
53 In connectron u'ith this declaration, how-
ever, NATO is proposing a "specrfic stabilisrng
measure" rvhich u'ould freeze the territonal ceil-
rngs of a number of central and eastern European
states at the level of national ceilings, thus res-
trictrng the capacity of these states to accept sta-
tioned forces. In NATO's vieu'. this measure
should not only appll' to the territory of the
Czech Repubhc, Hungary and Poland, but also
to parts of Russra, Ukraine and Belarus. Both
Russra and Belarus strongly oblected to being
included in this measure and further dtscussion
was postponed until a later date.
54. Russra has also complained that the air
component has been omitted from NATO pro-
posals on territorial limits, although it represents
the main stnke force of contemporary armed
forces. NATO argues that it reltes on the abrlrtl'
to increase alr power as a deterrent tn areas such
as Turkey and rt is not about to give this up6
55. No firm decrsion rvas taken on the flank
rssue. Some States Parties had proposed fully'
rntcgrating the 1996 Flank Document Agreement
of 3l Ma1' 1996 in the adapted CFE Treatl'
Russia, rvith some support from Ukrarne. Bul-
gana and Romanra, argued horrever that the
flank concept rras outdated and that restrictrons
on the southern flank endangered Russia's abrlrtl'
to mcet securitl' requirements rn the Caucasus
In partrcular, Turkel, fiercell' opposed anv re-
laxation in the flank regrmc and further drscus-
sions on this u'ere postponed
56. The States Partres have decrded to rncludc
rn the adapted CFE Treaty provisions to allou' a
t2
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State Party to recelve, rvith its express consent,
forces on its terntory that rvould exceed rts tcrri-
torial ccrhng for notrfied mrlrtary cxercises or as
temporary deployments, provided that both are
consistent u,ith the ob;ectives of an adapted
Treaty. It u'as also decided that any states rc-
questing to accede to the adaptcd Treaty would
be alloived to do so Accession would take place
on a case-by-case basis and u,ould require the
agreement of all the States Parties.
57. Russra is also demanding the inclusion of
a sufficreno, rule for military alliances rvith the
aim of setting legalll'-binding collective ceilings
for NATO as a whole, irrespective of the number
of its members. In Russia's view, this could
offer some protectron against any further NATO
enlargement.
IIL The Uniled Nations Disurmament
Conference in Geneva
58. The United Natrons Disarmament Confcr-
ence has been meeting in Geneva since 1979.
There are 6l LIN member states participating in
the negotratrons, u'hrch are based on the principle
of consensus
59. At its 1997 session rvhrch lasted from 20
Januarl' to l0 September. the following issues
were on the Conference agenda:
- 
cessatlon of the nuclear arns race and
nuclear drsarmament;
prevention of nuclear r.r'ar, including all
related matter,
- 
preventlon of an arrns race in outer
space:
- 
effectrve rnternatronal arrangements to
assure non-nuclear-weapon statcs
agalnst the use or threat of use of
nuclear \\'eapons.
nerv trpes of u,eapons of mass dcstruc-
tron and ne$' svstems of such weapons:
radrologrcal \\'eapons,
- 
comprehenslve prograrnme of disar-
mament,
transparencv rn armaments;
consrderatron and adoption of the an-
nual report and anv other report. as ap-
propriate for submissron to the Gencral
Asscmbll'of the Unrted Natrons.
60 The Confcrcnce's report to thc UN Gcn-
eral Assembll, mentions that throughout thc scs-
sion, intensive consultatlons were conductcd u,ith
a vicw to reaching conscnsus on the programmc
of u,ork. It thcn declares that rt x'as not possible
to estabhsh an1'negotiating mechanism on an1, of
the substantive items on the agenda A large
number of states rr,hrch u'ere not members of the
Conference rvere invited to participate in its
work. Since 1982. 20 states have applied for
membership of the Conference. Grven that the
present consensus rule may increasmgly' cause
problems r,r'ith expanded membershrp, special
coordinators have also been appointed to look
mto the question of the expansion of mcmbership
and the rmproved and effective running of the
Conference.
(i) Cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament
6l A number of delcgatrons submrtted a pro-
posal for a mandate for an ad hoc committcc to
start negotiatrons on a phased programme of
nuclear drsarmament for the complete ehmrnation
of nuclear \\'eapons u'ithin a specified trmeframc
and envisaged the creation of lvorking groups to
negotiate: (a) as a first step. a universal and
legally-bindrng multilateral agreement commit-
ting all states to the oblectrve of the complete
elimination of nuclear \\'eapons, (b) an agreement
on further steps requrred rn a phased programme
rvrth timeframes leading to the total ehmrnatron
of nuclear \\'eapons. and (c) a conl'cntron on the
prohibition of the productron of fissrle matcnal
for nuclear \\'eapons or othcr nuclcar explosivc
dcvrces taking rnto account the report of thc spe-
cial coordrnator on thcse rtems and the vlc\\'s rc-
lating to the scopc of the Treatr The Confcr-
encc drd not reach thc consensus requrred for a
decision on thrs sub.;cct
(ii) Anti-personnel landmines
62 The Conference on Drsarmament appornt-
ed a specral coordrnator to conduct consultatrons
' An eKensrve report on tlus sub.lect "The fight agarrst
the proliferatron of antr-persomel mrnes" submitted on
behalf of the Defcnce Committee br Mr Van dcr
Maelen, Rapportcur, 'llas drscussed at the Junc 1997
session of the Asscmbll (Document l-572)
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about a possible mandate on the issue of anti-
personnel landmines. In an initiatrve to force a
breakthrough in the deadlock in the Geneva Con-
ference on Disarmament, a conference held in
Oslo in September 1997 and attended by dele-
gates from 106 countnes, prepared the text of a
treaty on the total ban, use, production, storage
and transfer of anti-personnel mines, to be
adopted in Ottawa in December 1997. The so-
called "Ottawa Process" was initiated by Canada
in order to exert pressure on the UN Conference
on Disarmament in Geneva to make some pro-
gress on this subject. Russia and China, which
are among the main manufacturers and exporters
of anti-personnel mines did not participate.
President Yeltsin declared on l0 October 1997,
however, that Russia supported the objective of a
ban on anti-personnel mmes and that it wanted to
see the signature of such a treaty.
63. The United States took part in the confer-
ence but did not agree with the final draft text
because rt drd not obtarn satisfaction on threc
conditions it had set Its first condition was that
anti-personnel mines at the border between the
two Koreas rvould not have to be removed for
another nine vears. It further demanded a waiver
on the use of anti-personnel mines connected rvith
anti-tank mines and a clause to the effect that in
the event of aggressron, a country would be able
to withdrau' from the treaty after six months. It
also rvants self-destructive "smart mines" to be
excluded from the negotiations.
64. A NATO-sponsored rvorkshop in Moscorv
rn July 197'1 on "advanced research and tech-
nologres for detection and destruction of buried/
hidden antl-personnel landmines" brought toge-
ther an internatronal group of experts m order to
lrutlate collaboratrve research efforts. At this
conference, rt \\,as stated that multi-sensor
systems currently ln use have proved inadequate
under some conditrons, especrally in steep and
hilly regions, areas rvrth dense, resistant vege-
tatron, and regions affording natural and artificial
camouflage. In addrtion, it rvas noted that the de-
gree of metallic content m targets varies, creating
difficulties in sharing meaningful data conceming
the effectrveness of mine detectors, and efforts to
set international testing and operating standards
for mme detectors have been styrnied by drffering
natronal standards
(iii) A ban on the production ofiissile materials
65. A proposal rvas made to re-establish the
ad hoc committee on the prohibition of the pro-
duction of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices, but the Confer-
ence did not reach consensus on this issue.
66. It rvill not be easy to start negotiations on
this subject in the Conference on Disarmament.
A number of developing countries are demanding
a direct link betrveen such negotiations and a
bindrng obligation on the nuclear states to des-
troy all their nuclear weapons. The nuclear
states are not willing to meet that requirement.
On the other hand, France, Russia, the United
Kingdom and the United States have already de-
clared a moratorium on the production of fissile
materials. On 23 September, Russia and the
United States concluded an agreement under
rvhrch the United States would provide money
and assistance to convert Russra's most recent
plutonrum production sites into uranlum produc-
tion sites before the ycar 2000. They also agreed
to limit therr stockpiles of plutonium. The idea of
negotiating the so-called "cut-off' treaty rvas
launched in 1993 as a logical sequel to the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT). In particular, India and
Pakistan are now strongly opposed to the start of
negotiations 
- 
having failed to oppose the start of
negotiations on a CTBT, they discovered later on
that once the procedure had started, it could not
be stopped. It finally led to the adoption of the
CTBT by the UN General Assemblv and its
deposition for ratrfication
(iv) C h emical ll/eapons Conv entio n
6'l The Convention on the Prohrbrtion of the
Development, Productron, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and/or their Destruction
rvhich lvas srgned by 165 states, has norv been
ratrfied bv almost I00 statbs and entered into
force on 29 Aprrl 1997. The Organisation for
the Prohrbitron of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),
rvhich is based rn The Hague (Netherlands) and
became operational on 29 April 1997, is monrtor-
ing the implementation of the Convention. Accor-
drng to the Conventron, chemical rveapons are to
be eliminated by the year 2007.
68 The United States Congress ratified the
Conventron in Apnl 1997. With a stockpile of
t4
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around 30 000 metric tonnes of unitary chemical
weapons agents, the United States is actively in-
volved in large-scale destruction operations.
Russia, which has the world's largest offrcially
declared stockpile of 40 000 metric tonnes of
chemical weapons agents, ratified the Convention
at the beginning of November 1997 . ln doing so,
the Russian Duma also adopted legislation
establishing a system for periodic reports to it on
the status of the chemical weapons stockpile and
financial and environmental issues, as rvell as on
conversion of the chemical facilities to other
uses. The main problem lvhich had delayed
ratification was the high cost of the chemical
demilitarisation programme, for rvhich Russia
expects concrete contributions from other states.
The total cost of the destruction of Russia's
chemical rveapons stockpile is estimated at be-
tween $3.3 billion and $5 brllion8. Germany, the
Netherlands, Sweden and the United States are
already involved in programmes for the destruc-
tion of Russian chemical weapons Following
ratification, Russia will now be able to partici-
pate in the second session of the Conference of
States Parties to be held in The Hague on l-5
December 1997. This intematronal conference
will also discuss and decrde the future of the che-
mical u'eapons inspection system. Russra's rati-
fication rs also considered important because it
may trigger ratification by other countries Iran
deposited its instruments of ratification just be-
fore Russia.
IV. Nuclear arms reductions and nuclear
disarmament
(i) Introduction
69 The collapse of the Warsau' Pact and dis-
mantling of the Soviet Uqion have radrcally
changed the political landscape and, as a corol-
lary, the riaf in s'hich nuclear armaments are
perceived Now that the massive-scale threat has
ceased to exist, nuclear weapons have lost their
immediate military functron *'hrch rras based on
east-west confrontation Thel' mav not seem ap-
propnate to meet the neu' challenges of the post-
cold rvar penod
70. At the same time the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the Gulf War have directed interna-
tional attention to the new dangers of prolifera-
tion, with nuclear anarchy threatening to replace
the nuclear order of the cold war. Major efforts
are still under rvay with a viel to reducing
nuclear arsenals and preventing further prolif-
eration.
7l. The countries of Latin America, south-
west Asra and southern Africa have pledged
never to develop or use nuclear weapons. The
nuclear powers for their part have considerably
reduced their arsenals and demonstrated their
commitment to continuing along the road towards
drsarmament by approving the prolongation of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Yet we are
far from living rn a denuclearised u'orld. Indeed,
Russia and the United States are still each keep-
ing more than 3 500 strategrc nuclear warheads
operational and rvill hold as manl' again in stra-
tegic reserve. Even if the START II Treaty is
ratified, proliferation ma1' continue and tactical
nuclear weapons are still excluded from any re-
duction treaty'. Moreover, not only has Russia
not reduced, rt has even strengthened, the role of
nuclear weapons in rts defence concept The
world's fifth declared nuclear po\\'er, Chtna, re-
marns totally aloof from the disarmament process
and rs even in the process of moderntsing and
expanding its nuclear arsenal.
72. Nuclear armaments have alu'ays had an
important role as a polrtical instrument. During
the cold war the]' were symbohc, rvithin the
Alhance, of the absolute guarantee by the United
States of securitl, in Europe, u'hrle France and
the Unrted Krngdom used the possession of
nuclear weapons to assert therr national sover-
eignty. Nuclear armaments remain a kel' com-
ponent of rvestern securit\'. even tf they are con-
sidered to be the very last bastion against the
resurgence of malor conflrcts. If Europe s'ishes
to build a European defence rdentitr', the nuclear
dimension rvill necessarrlv be part of the debate.
73 Doubts about the srgnrficance and ultimate
purpose of nuclcar armaments are gaining
ground among the politrcal classes The fragrlitl'
of the nuclear consensus rs all the more u'orrying
given that the nerv strategrc role of nuclear
weapons remains to be defined
74. Thus it may become increasrngly difficult
to lustr! nuclear armaments There is a strong
l5
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possibility that the five-yearly NPT review con-
ferences and annual meetings of the preparatory
committee will turn rnto a quasi standing tribunal
in the focus of medra attention at which nuclear
countries will have to justifu themselves to non-
nuclear countries. The Group of 2l and coun-
tnes like Australia, New Zealand and Sweden,
will not tire of calling for the total elimination of
nuclear weapons and rvrll make skilful use of thc
various (IN fora such as the Geneva Conference
on Disarmament to promote this aim. While
Russia, China and non-declared nuclear countries
such as Israel, Pakistan and India are unlikely to
let themselves be swayed by such demands, the
role and utilisation of such tveapons has become
an issue in many rvestern countries for whom a
world rvithout nuclear weapons is not a wild
fancy. The question of whether such weapons
serve a useful purpose is once again very much
on the agenda.
(ii) The START Treaties
75 In the light of these nerv developmcnts, the
Unrted States and Russia realised that their
nuclear armaments levels rvere too high and this
prompted them to negotiate agreements on stra-
tegic nuclear armaments reductions. The
START I and START II Treaties \\'ere the result
ofthese negotiations
76 The first START Treaty rvas signed in
Moscou,on 20 July l99l by Presidents Bush and
Gorbachev after more than srx years of negotia-
trons. The Treaty made provisron for a reductron
in nuclear forces to no more than I 600 strategrc
nuclear delivery vehicles and 6 000 treaty-
accountable rvarheads, of rvhich no more than
4 900 may' be deplol'ed on rntercontrnental bal-
listic mrssiles and submanne-launched balhstic
missiles by the end of the treatl' rmplementatron
penod on 5 December 2001 It cut back consid-
erabll' on intercontrnental ballistrc missiles and
therr associated launchers and charges, on the
launchers for submarine-launched ballistrc mis-
srles and their rvarheads. and on heaw, bombers
and therr weapons svstems. rncluding long-range
nuclear cruise missrles
77 Ratificatron of the START I Treaty u'as
delayed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and
by, the Supreme Soviet drssolvrng rtself on 26
December l99l On I October 1992, the US
Senate agreed to ratrfi,the Treaty pending final
settlement of the provisions for its application by
four nervly independent republics (Russia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukrarne). Russra rati-
fied the Treaty on 4 November 1992 but held up
the exchange of the instruments of ratification
untrl Belarus, llkraine and Kazakhstan had sub-
scribed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and made arrangements for implementation of the
Treaty. For the purposes of the NPT, Russia
took over from the USSR as the state with a
nuclear weapons holding (Lisbon Protocol, 23
May 1992). The START I Treaty was ratified
b1, Kazakhstan on 2 July 1992, by Belarus on 4
February 1993 and by Ukraine in November
1993. Notwithstanding the Complications in rm-
plementing the Treaty orving to the economic,
technicaland political problems involved in repa-
triating Ukraine's nuclear arsenals to Russia, the
Treaty has already resulted in a substantial re-
duction in the number of strategic rveapons. On
the occasion of the l5th session of the Russian-
American Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC), u'hich took place in Geneva
rn May and June 1997, fi rvas declared that the
implementation of the START I Treaty was
"ahead of schedule"e.
78. The START II Trea[,u'as the subject of
"common agreement" at the Bush-Yeltsin summit
on 17 June 1992 and provided for a trvo-thrrds
reduction of strategic force levels as against
those u'hrch existed at thc beginning of the
1990s. It was signed on 3 Januarv 1993.
79. Besides the consrderable quantrtative re-
ductions foreseen by the Treaty, lts most impor-
tant component from the American standpoint
u,as the ehmination of all land-based strategic
ballistic missrles urth Multrple Independentll,
Targetable Re-entry Vehrcles (MIRVs) Under
the Treaty', the productron and deplorment of
MIRV missrles u'ould be banned as of I January
2008 and all the launchcrs of such mrssrlcs. in-
cluding those used for trarnrng and tests, w'ould
have to be destroyed or converted rnto srngle-
rvarhead missrle launchers
80. This complied u'rth an Amencan demand
making strategrc stabrlrty' contmgent on a con-
certed reductron of surface-to-surface multrplc
sarhead missiles rvhich rt consrdered to be the
l6
e Atlanfic I'ews, 20 June 1997
DOCUMENT I59O
most destabihsing weapons rn the nuclear arse-
nals.
81. There are trvo exceptions to this rule
which take account of Russia's particular situa-
tion and should facilitate the reconstruction of its
strategic potential, the backbone of rvhich is its
surface-to-surface MIRV missiles.
82. First of all, all Minuteman 3 missiles
(three warheads) and 105 of the 170 SS-19
missiles (six warheads) may be maintained, pro-
vided that they are converted to single-rvarhead
missiles. Furthermore, 20 launchers remain
available to both parties in order to put space-
craft into orbit, and the Russians are authorised
to convert 90 SS-18 missile silos to house mis-
siles carrying warheads of the SS-25 type. The
configuration of the new silos wrll be such that
they cannot be used in the future to launch inter-
continental ballistic mrssrles. Inspections u,ill
provide firm guarantees in thrs respect.
83 The START II verification procedure,
rnvolving a u'ide range of remote-sensing and on-
the-spot observation techniques, rvill ensure that
commitments arc complied rvith. Horvever, al-
most two years elapsed before the entry into
force of the START I Treaty on 5 December
1994, and it rvas only'in 1995 that the START II
ratification procedure started. The American
Senate ratrfied thc Treatl' on 26 January 1996
and ratification by' the Duma in Russia is still
posing problems (see next chapter).
84. The signing of the START II Treaty' rn
Moscou'on 3 Januan 1993 rr,as hailed as a de-
cisive breakthrough on the nuclear drsarmament
front and its entry into force rvas to be the first
step in a process of transforming relations bet-
rveen the trvo prolagonists of the cold rvar. Once
it had been completed, the security of Russia and
the United States uould no longer depcnd on
holding grgantic arsenals that had to be regularly
modernrsed but u'ould rather result from a pro-
cess of "cooperatrve denuclearisation", rvrth the
ultimate arm of estabhshing strateglc paritv at
suffrcient levels of armaments. Houever, rt has
to be admitted that thcse promises have not been
kept and that strategrc arrns reductrons are strll a
far cry from the arms of the START negotiators.
85. The drssolutron of the USSR and the
problems connccted lvrth elimrnating strategrc
armaments dcplol,ed on the territories of Ukrarne,
Belarus and Kazakhstan have delayed entry into
force of the START I Treaty, rvhich in turn
means that ratification of the START II Treaty,
which was the next step in the procedure, could
only enter an active phase at the beginning of
I 995.
(iii) The reasons for Russia's reluctance
to ratify the START II Treaty
86. The START II Treaty has stirred contro-
versy within Russra's political classes and par-
liament. Many polrticians and experts consider
that it constitutes a threat to Russian securitl'.
For instance, thc Director of the geopolitrcal and
military forecasting centre in Moscow, Alexei
Arbatov, has pointed out that the START II
Treaty means destroying surface-to-surface in-
tercontinental MIRV missiles rvhich are the core
of Russian strategic forces, u'hile the Unrted
States is authorised to maintain its Tndent 2 sea-
to-surface ballistic missrles which also constitute
a counter-force capability. Given that Russia
does not possess sea-to-surface s)'stems equiva-
lent to the Trident and that its submanne-
launched ballistic missrle (SLBM) fleet is more
vulnerable than that of the United States to anfl-
submarine rvarfare technrques, the drsmanthng of
its surface-to-surface MIRV missrles u'ould de-
prrve it of a counter-force capabiliry'
87. The second element ofthe debate concerns
the financial consequences of the Treatl' The
Russians claim that it is expensn'e to destrol'
nuclear warheads and that there is pressure on
their financral resources. Moreover they' arc
obliged to restructure their strategic arsenal in
order to compll' u'ith the obligations of the
START II Treatl'. and to replace. at an exorbt-
tantll'hrgh cost, their SS-18 and SS-19 mtsstlcs
u'ith srngle-u'arhead SS-25 missrles In order to
marntain an arrnamcnts levcl compatible iirth the
final cerhngs of START II. Russia u'ould har,'e to
produce and deplov ncarlv 500 neu' surface
mrssiles at a rate of 80 or 90 a vear untrl 2008
At the moment rt deploys about ten a )'ear and rs
unhkelv to exceed this limit. Furthcrmore the
marntenance costs for additional mobile surface-
to-surface missrles s'ould be srx times higher
than those of thc surface-to-surface rnterconti-
nental missiles that they' rvould be replacrng
88. Finally', accordrng to the most opttmtsttc
forccasts, Russian GDP u'rll grorr by 25 to 30'/o
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over the next five years and military budgets will
hardly exceed the level of 20 billion dollars.
Since one third of that sum will have to be spent
on improving the situation of Russian army per-
sonnel, the amount of money available for con-
vertrng the strategic arsenal is likely to be insuf-
ficrent.
89. Military experts contend that the START
II Treaty will not only emasculate Russian stra-
tegic forces but that their response capability will
also be u'eakened by the concomitant develop-
ment of an American anti-missile defence system.
Their observation that six of the eleven radar that
used to be available to the USSR are now outside
Russian territory, rvhile the Krasnoyarsk radar
rvould have to be drsmantled, is a point that must
be taken on board in any assessment of the bal-
ance of porver. In the same vein, Admiral Rudolf
Golosov has remarked that one cannot ignore the
vulnerability of Russian strategic forces to
strikes by high-precision conventional weapons
such as the Tomaharvk cruise mrssiles that the
Americans have already deployed on ships and
submarines. Moreover, as the Russians see it,
parity must be based on a qualitatively equivalent
strategic capability on either side, and on the
possibilrty of responding effectively to an offlen-
sive attack by enem1, forces.
90. These difficulties shed uncertainty on the
ratificatron of the START II Treaty. although
some people have pointed out that the cost of the
operation could be offset by later savrngs on
strategic forces running costs An unofficial esti-
mate of the cost of implementing START I sets
the figure at 30 billion roubles, to which must be
added a further 7 to l0 brlhon roubles for
START II. How'ever, the cost of maintarrung the
strategic forces rvould be brought dorm from its
present level of 20 bilhon roubles per y,ear to l5
billion, once the agreed reductions had been im-
plemented.
91. In order to assist Russia rvith the imple-
mentation of the START Treaties, the Unrted
States has established a financial prograrnme
bearing the same name as the Num-Lugar
amendment. The prevailing attitude m Russia,
however, is one of sceptrcism, given that the
funds are meted out very spanngly and that the
main beneficiaries are American consultants and
service companles
92. Another area of concern for the Russian
leadership is the possible Amencan deplopnent
of an antimissile defence svstem to protect the
national territory. Indeed, the Republican op-
position has expressed approval for such a pro-
ject, and the fact that the date of deployment of
the hypothetical NMD (2003) coincides rvith that
of the planned completion of the reductions under
START II onll' aggravates Russian fears of an
erosion oftheir response capabrlity by,the end of
the disarmament process. Furthermore, rvhile
accepting the legitimacy of setting up a system of
defence against theatre missiles under the ABM
Treaty, the Kremlin authorities are concemed
that the performance of high-velocity anti-missile
missiles will constitute a threat to their strategic
missiles. This explains their insistence upon a
clear dividing line betrveen theatre missile de-
fence systems, which lvould be authorised, and
strategic missile defence systems, rvhich rvould
have to comply u'ith the restrictions of the ABM
Treaty.
93. NATO enlargement may also jeopardise
ratification of the Treaty. Russia rvill have to
adopt special measures to accommodate the fact
that 80% of its strategic potential s'ill be within
the range of NATO bombers and that the credi-
bility of its nuclear response capabihty will be
limited by the planned START II reductions.
94. In conclusion, the Duma has laid doun
two conditions for ratifl,ing the START II
Treaty:
(i) the allocation of sufficient resources
for the reconstitution of a credrble deter-
rence rvithin the framen'ork of the Treaty,
(it) strict comphance u'ith the spint and
letter of the ABM Treaty, uhrch means
drawing a clear divrdrng line betrveen
theatre missile defence systems and stra-
tegic missrle defence svstems.
95. In order to adapt the rate of reductions to
Russia's economic circumstances, the deadlines
lvere rccentl,v prolonged b1' five 1'ears follo$,rng
an agreement concluded bettveen Russia and the
United Statcs on 26 September 1997
96. On that date, the United States agreed to
push back thc effective date of the START II
Treaty by five vears, therebl clearrng the way for
negotiating a further reductron of strategic arse-
l8
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nals in the framework of a START III Treaty.
The agreement signed with Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine and Russia allowed the United States to
develop missile defence systems not exceeding a
speed of 3 km/second under the 1972 ABM
Treaty. Such systems include Theatre High Alti-
tude Area Defence Systems.
(iv) The Comtreffie Nuclear Test Ban
97. On 24 September 1996, the Comprehen-
sive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was
opened for signature in New York. This Treaty
imposes a total ban on the explosion of nuclear
weapons in the atmosphere, in space, under water
and under the ground It takes over the main
provisions of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaty, prohibiting the carrying out of "any
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other
nuclear explosion" and urging each party "to
prevent an1'such nuclear explosron at any place
under its jurisdiction or control". Each party
must furthermore refrain from causmg,
encouraging or rn an1' way participating in such
explosions (Article I) In recognition of the diffi-
culty of such an undertaking, it rvas further
stipulated that should the Treaty not take effect
on the third anniversary of its opening for signa-
ture, the Secretarl'-General of the United
Nations, s,ith u,hom the Treaty is /deposited,
would convene a conference at the request ofthe
majonty of states already having deposited their
ratification instruments, and attended by them, at
uhich it u'ould be decided by consensus which
measures could be adopted. in compliance with
international larv, to speed up the ratrfication
process. This procedure rvould be repeated each
1'ear in the hope of persuading recalcitrant coun-
tries to accede to the Treaty. Threshold countrres
could resist international pressure, as indeed they
drd when they' opposed the NPT. However. a
CTBT signed and ratified b1'a large number of
states would be an rnternational rcference even
before its entry into force. As is the case for
other arms control agreements, there rs provrsion
for a state u'ishrng to withdraw from its obliga-
tions, but only' in the event of extraordinary cir-
cumstances rvhich 
.leopardise its supreme inter-
ests. The parly rvishing to u'ithdra\r, must in that
case give advance notlce of its intentions and
justrfu its course of action Russia announced
that it would u-ithdrau' from the Treaty in order
to carry out tests if it had no other means at its
disposal of checking the security and reliability
of its nuclear weapons. Such interpretations of a
country's "supreme" interests could lead to arbi-
trary decisions outside of intemational verifica-
tion procedures.
98. In order to ensure implementation of the
Treaty and organise a framework rvithin which
signatory states can consult and cooperate with
each other, a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty Organisation is to be established in
Vienna. It is to be composed of the Conference
of Participating States, an Executive Council and
a Technical Secretariat. The Executive Council,
which is to play a leading political role in the
decision-making process, rvill be composed of 5l
members from six different geographic regions.
The Technical Secretariat rvill consist of a Direc-
tor General plus the reqursite scientific, technical
and other staff.
99 The international monitoring system res-
ponsible for checking compliance u.ith the Treaty
will include seismic, radronuclide, hydroacoustic
and infrasonic equipment. The svstem rvrll be
supported by an International Data Centre
attached to the Technical Secretarrat. The syn-
ergy between these different technologies rvill
make it possible to venfl' activities below thc
power of one krlotonne, s'hrch is the seismic de-
tectability threshold that s'as adopted.
100. On-the-spot international venfication can
be called for wrth regard to any state carrying out
suspicious and non-justrfied actrvitres. Such a
request must be backed up by information col-
lected by the international monitonng system, by
any relevant technical information obtained bv
means of national verification s)'stems ln accor-
dance with the generalll' recognised pnncrplcs of
international larv, or by a combinatron of both
l0l. Ten years after entry into force of the
Treaty, a conferencc of signatones rvill be con-
vened in order to examine rts mode of operation
and effectiveness The Conference of Participat-
ing States, the maln bodr of the Comprehensrve
Nuclear Test-Ban Treatl' Organisatron, u'ill hold
regular annual meetrngs to revreu' any points,
questions or problcms ri'rthin the scope of the
Treaty. A preparatory committce comprising
representatives of all srgnatories u'ill be rcspon-
sible for prepanng CTBT rmplementation and for
organising the first sessron of the Conference of
l9
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Participating States It \\'ill have rnternatronal
organisation status.
102. The Treaty, rvhich has unlimited duration,
rvill enter into force 180 days aftcr thc deposit of
the instrument of ratification of all the states
listed in its annex, but rn no casc earlier than two
years after its opening for srgnature. The annex
contains a list of 44 states uhich participated rn
the Conference on Disarmament on l8 June 1996
and m the prcparatory u'ork for the 1996 session,
and u'hich possess nuclear power stations or re-
search centres. The "threshold" states are in-
cluded in the hst because they match the stated
cnteria.
103. On l0 September 1996, the United
Nations General Assembll,adopted the CTBT as
negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament
and mstructed the UN Secretary-General to make
the necessary arrangements for governments to
sign the Treaty. The decrsron was adopted by
158 votes for,3 against (lndia, Bhutan and
Lrby,a) and 5 abstentrons (Cuba, Lebanon,
Mauntius, Syria and Tanzania) Nrneteen dele-
gations from UN member countries rvere absent
or not authorrsed to vote due to late payment of
their dues to the Organrsatron To date, 146
countrres have signed the Treaty. The ratifica-
tion process has started, but none of the five
superporlers has ratified rt y'et.
104. Indra has announced that rt does not sub-
scnbe to the planned Treatl,' and u,ill not particr-
pate rn the envrsaged monrtonng system. It does
not consrder the Treatl' to be a step towards uni-
versal nuclear drsarmament Moreover, it con-
siders that the terms of the Treaty are unaccept-
able rn that thev imprnge on lts sovereign right to
decide. rn light of its natronal rnterests, rvhether
or not to accede to rt Pakrstan approved the
Resolution but specrfied that rt rvould only sign
the Treatl, if India drd hkerr rse The procedure
u'hrch u'as followed. unpreccdented m the historl'
of the Conference on Disarmament, urll certainly'
have an impact on the future of the Conference
105 The rnternational communrty's maln con-
cerns about nuclear tcsts relate to the prolifera-
tion of nuclear \\'eapons. the race for a qualitatrve
lmprovement of nuclear arsenals and radioactive
contamlnatlon of man's envlronment.
106. These day's it rs possible, urth no pnor
testrng, for any' state \\'ith lts o$n technologl,
base or with sufficient financial resources to ac-
quire the technology to manufacture relatively
simple atomic fission sy'stems. Horvever, by im-
posing a test ban on all signatones. the CTBT
may strengthen the NTP, since rt rectrfies a
major imbalance between the rrghts and obhga-
tions of nuclear and non-nuclear states. This bal-
ance cannot be apprecrated until all threshold
countries have officrally acceded to the CTBT.
107 . Testing is necessary not onl1, to modernise
the first trvo generations of nuclear u'eapons, but
also to develop "thrrd generation" nuclear weap-
ons, which aim for a new degree of perfection in
the nuclear fission and fusion techniques used,
urth a view to providing such rveapons rvith
special effects.
108 Thus an end to nuclear tests u'ill be bene-
ficial in terms of arms control rn that it rvill pre-
vent any substantral qualrtatrve rmprovements of
nuclear weapons. A test ban rvrll also make it
highly unlikely that completely' neu' and unfore-
seen phenomena urll arise m the nuclear weapons
field
109 On 15 Ma1', then on l7 August 1995,
China performed tu'o underground nuclear tests,
its 42nd and 43rd sincc 1964, on the Lop Nor
site in Xrnliang province These tests were con-
demned b1' the Unrted States, the Unrted Krng-
dom and Russra as u'ell as by Australia, Japan
and South Korea China has nou' developed a
nerv intercontrnental balhstrc missile, the Dong-
feng 31. rvrth an estimated range of 8 000 km,
rvhrch means that it is capable for the first trme
of reachrng Europe and the east coast of the
Unrted States. France carned out slx nuclear
tests from 5 September 1995 onu.ards in
Mururoa, in order to check thc securrtv of its
deterrent force The third explosron. detonated
on 28 October, had a force equrvalent to I l0 000
tonnes of TNT. The French tcsts \\'ere crrtrcrsed
by' Nen' Zealand. Australia. thc Pacrfic states.
Japan, Russia and the Unrted Statcs
(v) Prolongation ofthe
N o n - h o I ifer atio n T r e aty ( N PT)
ll0 The representatives ofthe 175 signatories
of the NPT. u'hrch u'as signed rn 1968. met from
l7 Aprrl to 12 May' 1995 in order to revieu,and
prolong the Treatl'. The five permancnt mem-
bcrs of the Unrted Natrons Secuntv Council
20
DOCUMENT 1590
(China, France, Russia, the United States and the
United Kingdom) unarumously, adopted Resolu-
tion 984 provrding for assistance to non-nuclear
states whrch might be vrctims of a nuclear atLack
The United States and the United Krngdom an-
nounced that they rvould stop the productron of
plutonium and of uranium enriched for military
purposes. The decision to prolong the Treaty
indefinitely rvas taken on ll May by 175 of the
178 signatories of the NPT. The Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia, Kiribati and Taiwan were
absent from the Conference. Three documents
were adopted. The first imposed additional obli-
gations on member states, including nuclear dis-
armament, and called on all parties to put an end
to nuclear tests once and for all in 1996. The
second estabhshed a drsarmament monitonng
procedure The thrrd, at the rnitiative of 14 Arab
states, called for the creation of a nuclear-free
zone in the Middle East and the accession
"without exceptron" of all states of the Middle
East to the NPT. In ordcr to obtain an unlimited
prolongation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the
nuclear po\\'ers agreed to several obligations
Inter aha they specrfied 
- 
and to a large extent
harmonised 
- 
therr "negative security guaran-
tees" and pledged to refram from using or threat-
ening to use nuclear \\'eapons against those
countries rvhrch did not possess such rveapons.
Strong pressure is currently being brought to
bear in the framervork of the Geneva disarma-
ment negotiatrons to move from these unilateral
commitments to the stage of a more legally
binding multilateral agreement.
(vi) Nuclear arms reduction in Europe
I I I By companson u,ith the cold-war sttua-
tron, the numbers of nuclear \\'eapons in Europe
have been substantralll, reduced. Russia has
urthdraun from the European theatre all the tac-
tical nuclear weapons belonging to the former
Sovret Unron. and the Unrted States norv only has
150 8-61 nuclear gravrtl' bombs lcft in Europe.
The United Krngdom rs m the process of drs-
mantling rts WE-177 bombs, whrle France has
decided to scrap all rts ground-to-ground nuclear
systems
ll2 The nerv gcopolrtical realitres m Europe
have considerably reduced the likelihood of a
conflict involving nuclear \\,eapons for the fore-
seeable future
ll3. Atlantic Alliance members have adapted
their defence arrangements to the new reality.
Nuclear forces have been scaled down and re-
structured from a conceptual and operational
point of vrerv. The doctrinal differences of the
cold war have practically drsappeared and thc
three Alliance nuclcar powers are in agreemcnt
over the broad thrust of nuclear deterrence. The
United States, the United Kingdom and France
regard nuclear weapons more than ever as politi-
cal instruments within the framervork of deter-
rence based on a smaller arsenal. Their functions
are limited to counterbalancing nuclear arsenals
elsewhere in the rvorld and offering a supplemen-
tary option to dissuade possible proliferants from
using NBC \\'eapons. To compensate for any
inadequacres in nuclear deterrence rn the face of
rudimentarl'NBC arsenals, the three powers are
seeking u,ays of conventionalising the lower
stages of deterrence b1' dcploying hrgh-prcr:ision
conventlonal rveapons u,ith high-porvered e:xplo-
sive charges rvhich are capable of producing
satisfactory' results, u'ithout the undesrrable ef-
fects of therr nuclear counterparts.
I 14. Desprte the reductions, the West's rCeter-
rence system has survived the end of the cold
rvar. NATO's collective potential strll consists of
American and Britrsh nuclear weapons. The
United States still marntarns 150 sub-str:rtegic
weapons in rvestern Europe. These slmbolil;e the
Allies' nuclear solidaritv and maintain the stra-
tegic coupling betu'een Europe and the tlnited
States. The United Kingdom, Germany, Ital1,,
Belgium, the Netherlands. Greece and T'urkey
have the installatrons and rnfrastructurc t,l ac-
commodate American nuclear weapons
I 15 The Unrted Krngdom has nou' abandoned
rts WE-177 nuclear bombs It intends to rely
solely on submarrnc-launched balhstrc mrssrlcs
and thus ri'ill be the only nuclear po\\'er rvhose
deterrent force rs made up of a single component
The British Navl, rs rn thc process of modr:mrs-
rng rts fleet of submarines by acqurnng four
"Vanguard" class vessels. The submarines are
equipped u'rth Tndent missrles u'hose accuracy,
range and flexibilrty' are far supenor to thc,se of
their Polaris predecessors, Because of these
charactenstics. Tndent can be used for both
substrategic and strategrc mlsslons The number
of nuclear rvarheads on board each subnrLarine
u'ill be reduced from 128 to a maximum of 96
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116. France has also abandoned the Hades
missile and medium-range ground-to-ground
missiles. Its deterrent force will in future be
based solely on submarine and air components.
Under the nuclear-powered guided-missile sub-
marine progra[rme, France is to commission four
"Triomphant" class submarines, with the first
coming into service around 2005. Each subma-
rine will be equipped rvith 16 M-45 missiles car-
rying 6 nuclear TN-75 rvarheads. The M-51
missile, fitted u,ith a new nuclear warhead, is to
replace the M-45 from 2010. The airborne com-
ponent consists of three Mirage 2000N squad-
rons and trvo Super Etendard Navy flotilla,
equipped with medrum-range air-to-ground mis-
siles (ASMP). From 2000, these aircraft will be
phased out and replaced by Rafales. From 2008,
the ASMP-Plus rvill take over from the ASMP.
It wrll have a range of 100 km at low altitude and
500 km at high altitude (as against 80 and 300
km for the ASMP).
ll7. On 26 July 1994, France and the United
Kingdom decided that the joint Anglo-French
Commrttee on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, es-
tablished provrsronally' in October 1992, should
have permanent status. The Committee, which
brrngs together senlor crvil servants from the
French and British Foreign and Defence mrnis-
tries, has made a comparison of the two coun-
tries' attitudes to the role of deterrence, nuclear
doctrines and rdeas, anti-missile defence, disar-
mament and non-prohferation.
ll8. In Germanr', Alliance nuclear wcapons
u'ere regarded in the past as essential for protect-
ing national ternton, but, at the same time, as
symbolic both of a threat to the nation's exis-
tence rn the event of east-west conflict and of its
dependence on other porvers 
- 
contrary to the
Unrted Krngdom or France where nuclear weap-
ons \\'ere felt. on the u'hole, to be an instrument
of national independence and political porver in
international relations. The major debate that
deployment of "Euro-missrles" aroused in Ger-
many shou'ed that even under Soviet threat, con-
sensus on deterrence could not be taken for
granted. When the Berhn Wall fell and Germany
was reunited. nuclear weapons became even
more diffrcult to justrfl' rn the eyes of many Ger-
mans. The secunty agreement signed between
France and Germanv rn December 1996 repre-
sented a step forward the German Govcrnment
stated that it was ready to "enter into a dialogue
on the functron of nuclear deterrence, in the con-
text of the European defence policy"to. The
Franco-German axrs was to be the basis of
European defence. Germany's participation is
therefore essential to it and could bnng about
that of other European countries. Moreover, the
two countries have already established close co-
operation in the field of conventional rveapons
and have, in the Defence Council, an institution
where consultation on nuclear matters could take
place on a regular basis.
I19. Although the United Kingdom, as a
nuclear power, is in quite a different position to
Germany, the Anglo-French Committee held the
mirror up to what Franco-German dialogue could
be. At the start of any consultation, there must be
a search for a consensus on the role of nuclear
weapons in European security.
(vii) Are Rassia's nuclear forces deteriorating ?
120. After the break-up of the Soviet Union,
Russia was confronted rvith the challenge of
carving out a place for itself that allorved rt to fill
the vord left by its predecessor and regain its
position m the s'orld.
l2l. Uncertainty as to the future role of the
armed forces in a Russia no longer involved in
global confrontatron rvith a strategic adversary,
combined rvith a substantial reduction in the def-
ence budget, brought about a decline in the pol-
itical and social status of the army, u'hich could
only lead to tension and discontent among the
mrlrtary. Materral considerations are also tendrng
to make the situatron rvorse Low u'ages or de-
la1's in their payment, the lack of decent housrng
for offrcers' famrhes returning home from
abroad, partlcularl!' from Germany, noturth-
standrng the fact that that country financed the
building of thousands of homes in Russia. u,ere
crrcumstances that u,ere explorted b1' a varrety' of
political forces seekrng to take advantage of
anger and drsapporntment felt rvithrn the army'
122 Some of the mrlitary have taken advantage
of the situation to lncrease therr influence rn the
polrtical domain. Such rvas the case in Moldova
u-here General Lebed, rvho had command of the
Russian army units there, conducted policies of
r0 Rehtrcns tnternattonales et strategtques,




his orvn in defiance of the Government. It was
also the case in Georgia, where Russran soldiers
set themselves up as the defenders of Russra's
geostrategic interests.
123. Although it rvould seem that Russia's pro-
posals drrected tou'ards encouraging convergence
behveen its oim and European and Atlantic se-
curitv and defence structures, and improving the
qualrty of its involvement rn the decision-making
processes are havrng some success. there is still a
possibrlitl, that Russia wrll come to feel increas-
ingly rsolated, rvhrch cannot be in anyone's inter-
est.
124. The fear of isolation and of being sidelined
by European rnstitutions, an abrding drstrust of
NATO and dissatisfaction with the latter's en-
largement into central Europe, together rvith a
desire for greater recognition by' thc West, ex-
plains Russia's reluctance to dismantle rts
nuclear arsenal.
125. After lengthl' drscussions, NATO and
Russia have finally reached agreement on setting
up enhanced cooperation within the frameu'ork of
the Foundrng Act srgned in Paris on 27 May
1997 The fact that Kremlin leaders have just
approved a massive secunW plan setting out
Russia's role rn the 2lst century rs greatlv to be
welcomed Thrs represents a new mrlitary doc-
tnne purportrng that the malor threat for Russia
comes not from enemles bevond the country's
borders but from socral and economic problems
rvithin them The successful involvement of
Russian troops rn IFOR and SFOR operations in
Bosrua, and the fact they performed uell there,
therefore proves that the present drlemma rs one
that can be resolved.
126 Notri ithstandrng these posrtive develop-
ments, it should be notcd that the Russran armcd
forces are strll deeplv demorahsed Thc Charr-
man of the Defence Council, Mr Yurr Baturin,
complarning of rnadequatc funding, has stated
that "if thrngs contrnue as thcy, are no\\' for an-
other tu'o vcars. \\'e arc hkcl1, to end up rvrth a
nan' x'rthout shrps, an arrforce n'ithout aircraft
and a defcncc rndustn' rncapable of producrng
up-to-date \\'eapons . uhrlc thc former Defencc
Mrnrstcr, Igor Rodronov, has n'arned against the
risk of hcadquarters losrng command of therr
arrnles. "Russra couid soon rcach a thrcshold
beyond whrch its nuclear missiles and systems
will be out of control"
127 The Chairman of the State Duma's De-
fence Committee, Lev Rokhlin, who as a General
commanded Russian troops in Chechnya during
the recent conflict, has warned President Yeltsin
that Russia's nuclear forces are heading torvards
"extinction" because of lack of funds and main-
tenance. He stated that there was no money for
the work to extend the life of the missiles that are
on combat duty and have exhausted tlerr guaran-
teed term of servrcc, and the necessary funds
were not bcing allocated for rvork on new Rpes
of u'eapons. Westcm sources have taken these
warnings senously, especralll, regarding a deter-
ioration rn vital command and control systems
and in readiness and reliability'1
128. Indecd, the frustrated and undrsciplined
Russian military undeniably represent a thrcat
not only to their o\vn government and therr fellow
countr),men, but arc also a latent dangcr for
neighbounng states and, in vrew of the presence
of strategic weapons, a nightmare for the u'hole
rvorld.
129. The srtuatron poses serious problems in
terms of troop morale and dcsperation rn the
national defence industry, leading to a rise in
cnme and illegal tradc, including rvidespread and
potentially, dangerous trafficking in armaments,
not to mentron nuclear components. u'hrch could
complicate mrlrtan' reform and nuclear non-pro-
lifcration
130. It rs rmpossrble to ascertaln hou' manv
\\'capons are rn crrculatron rn the cri'ihan sphere
and whethcr they rnclude tactrcal nuclear \\'eap-
ons. It rs clarmed that Russia strll has some
l0 000 such u'eapons in its possessron'' The
former General, Alexander Lebed. accused the
government of concealing the truth over thc drs-
appearance of more than 80 nuclcar "mlnl \\'eap-
ons'' rvhrch accordrng to him had becn un-
accounted for srnce thcv u'ere Ieft behrnd rn a
number of formcr Sovrct Repubhcsri Experts
have confirmed the cxrstence of such "rnrnt
nukcs". u'hrch are similar to the Unrted States'
nuclear demolrtron munrtrons, all of u'hrch rvcre
destrol'cd rn I99l Thcfts of matenal used rn the
T'he In|enratronaI [{erald 7'rrbune.27 \ne 199'7
l'he linanctal 7 nrcs.21 September 1997
|''lRC - I {a n tle I sb I ad. 21 September I 997
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manufacture of nuclear weapons, such as pluto-
nium or enriched uranium, have already been
noted.
l3l. The Russian Government has repeatedly
declared that it is in full control of its nuclear
arsenal and this assertion has been confirmed by
United States secunty experts. It should, how-
ever, be noted that the export of military nuclear
know-how through the emigration of nuclear ex-
perts from the territory of the former Soviet
Uruon is a long-term risk.
132. The potential consequences of the exis-
tence of large quantities of nuclear rvaste and
disused nuclear submarines have also begun to
arouse major concern. The case of the Northern
Fleet, analysed in the Bellona report (the Bellona
report on the Northern Fleet was the first docu-
ment to be banned in Russia after the collapse of
the Soviet Union) is an excellent rllustration of
the problem. According to the report, there are at
least 21 067 cubic metres of sohd radioactive
waste and at least 75 423 cubic metres of radro-
active effluent in naval bases, shrpl,ards and
storage installations used by the Northern Fleet.
More than 24 000 fuel rods and nine reactor
cores are stored in temporary deposits Of over
130 nuclear submannes that Russia has rvith-
dras,n from service, 88 belong to the Northern
Fleet and 52 of them have been decommissioned,
still rvith their load of nuclear fuel. Most of the
installations used by the Northern Fleet are allo
cated on the Kola peninsula, affecting an area
rvith a population of over 100 000 inhabitants.
The largest temporary storage depot of irradiated
nuclear fuel is Andreeva Bay, 40 km from the
Norwegian border. Here, 21000 irradrated fuel
rods, equivalent to 90 nuclear reactors, are stored
in very poor conditions. Serious leaks of radio-
activity rvere detected in the I980s. To a very
large extent, the transport and reprocessing of
nuclear waste do not comply with safety regula-
tions and the situation is aggravated by a lack of
funds for maintaining existing storage and pro-
cessing plants, and for building safer, more mod-
ern installations. In 1994, only 35 % of the funds
allocated were actually paid over to the Northern
Fleet. The amounts received were basically used
to pay the salaries of and provide social assis-
tance to Fleet staff. Over the last two years,
nothing whatsoever has been done to guarantee
the safety of the nuclcar waste
133. Until 1991, Russia practised Arctic dump-
ing of its radioactrve naval waste. The one train
used for transporting waste to the reprocessing
plant at Chelyabinsk called at the ports only three
times a year. Full containers of irradiated fuel
have been stored in the open for years on end and
accidents have occurred. In September 1996, a
memorandum of undcrstanding on cooperation on
environmental matters was signed between the
United States and Russian defence ministers
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Source. Consohdated matrix on the basrs of data available as of I Januarl' 1997, Joint Consultative
Group, l8 March 1997
' Icelan4 KazakhsUn and Lurembourg have no u'eapon limrts in the applicatron zone
'Reduction contrnues.
'TLE belongrng to the Black Sea Fleet is not included.
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APPENDIX II('lt'li cetlrngs, ltabrlitres, redttctions and holdtngs, as of I January 1997
State'
-l'anks ACVs Artrllcrv Arrcraft I{clicopters
Cerl I-rab Itcd I Iold Ccrl Lrab I{cd I Iold Ccrl l,rab Itcd IIold Ccil l,iab. Red I{old. Cerl. Lrab. Red Hold
Armenra ))t\ 0 0 l02 220 (r5 lll 2l It 285 0 0 225 t00 0 0 6 50 0 0 7
Azerbarlan2 220 0 t3 2'70 220 (_) 7t 557 285 0 42 301 100 0 0 48 50 0 0 l5
Bclarus I 800 1 7'73 |'7'73 I 178 2 600 I 341 I 34t 2 518 t6t5 3 J I 533 294 130 130 286 80 0 0 71
Belgium 314 28 28 334 I 099 284 284 6't8 320 58 58 312 232 0 0 166 46 0 0 46
Bulgana | 475 '794 '794 | 475 2 000 332 132 I 985 r 750 404 410 I 750 235 100 100 235 67 0 0 43
Canada 77 0 0 0 271 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 90 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Czech Rep 957 1 123 I 123 952 1 367 I 217 I 217 1 367 767 I 409 I 409 767 230 5l 57 143 50 0 0 36
Denmark 353 t46 146 343 3r6 0 0 286 553 0 0 503 106 0 I 74 12 0 0 12
Irrance r 306 39 39 I 156 3 820 570 510 3 574 1 292 149 t49 I t92 800 0 0 650 396 66 66 326
(ieorsra 220 0 0 '79 220 0 0 102 285 0 0 92 100 0 0 6 50 0 0 3
Germany 4 166 2 566 2 566 3 248 3 146 4 25'7 4 257 2 537 2 705 | 623 | 62f 2 058 900 140 140 560 306 0 0 205
Grcecc l 735 I 013 I 099 I 735 2 534 0 449 2 325 I 878 505 517 r 878 650 0 79 4tt6 30 0 0 20
IIungary 835 510 510 797 I 700 65 531 I 300 840 201 201 840 180 0 3l l4t 108 0 0 59
Itali' I 348 300 324 I 283 3 339 53'7 537 3 03r I 955 205 205 I 932 650 0 0 516 139 56 71 132
Moldova 210 0 0 0 2r0 0 59 209 2so 0 0 i55 50 0 0 27 50 0 0 0
Netherlands 113 0 0 722 I 080 261 261 610 607 59 59 448 230 0 0 t8l 50 22 91 12
Nonvav 170 \27 t2l 1'70 225 57 57 199 52'7 17 t7 246 100 0 0 74 0 0 0 0
I'oland I 130 I 120 I 130 I 729 2 t50 30t 900 I 442 l610 741 770 I 58t 460 6l 94 384 130 0 0 94
Portugal 300 0 0 186 430 0 0 346 450 0 0 320 160 0 ., 105 26 0 0 0
Romanra I 175 I 591 1 591 1 775 2 t00 973 973 2 091 1 4'75 2 123 2 423 1 466 430 '78 '78 3'72 120 0 0 l6
I{ussra' 6 400 3 187 3 r8tt 5 541 I I 4tt0 5 416 5 419 l0 198 6 4t5 658 660 6 011 3 416 I 002 1 029 2 891 890 99 99 812
Slovakra 478 578 578 478 683 443 44f 683 383 619 679 383 I 15 ,(., 30 113 25 0 0 l9
Spatn 791 371 48t 725 I 588 0 0 1 194 I 310 8'7 88 I 230 3r0 0 0 200 90 0 0 28
'l'urkcy 2 195 I 060 I 060 2 5(tf 3 t20 0 5 2 424 , 523 122 t22 2 843 150 0 115 162 103 0 0 25
TIK 1015 183 I tt3 521 3 116 30 30 2 4t], 636 0 0 436 900 0 0 624 384 5 5 289
Ukarnc' 4 080 1 974 | 9'74 4 063 5 050 I 545 I55t 4 81'7 4 040 0 0 3 164 I 090 550 550 940 330 0 0 294
US 4 006 192 639 I I15 5 372 0 0 1 849 2 492 0 5 612 '784 0 0 220 431 0 0 \26
For WIO 20 000 t2 650 t2 764 l8 639 30 000 il 698 t2 855 27 5t7 20 000 6 524 6 574 i8 u68 6 800 2 002 2 099 5 592 2 000 99 99 | 469
NNTO 19 t42 6 025 6 692 l4 l0t 29 825 5 996 6 450 21 464 18 286 2 825 2 843 14 010 6 662 140 338 4 2t8 2 026 149 233 I 221
Total 39 142 r8 675 r9 456 32 740 59 825 t7 694 r9 305 50 438 38 286 9 349 9 417 32 878 13 462 2 142 2 437 9 810 4 026 248 332 2 690
,Sorr.? Consohdalcd malflx on thc basrs ofdala avarlablc as of I Jnnuary 1997, Joint Consultalrve Group, l8 Marcb 1997.
' 
Iceland. Kazathstan nnd Luxcmbourg harc no wcapon limits m thc applicalion zone 2 Rcduction conlrlrucs. I TLE bclonging 10 thc Black Sca Flect is not includ€d.
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